I am Spirit, formless and free;

[Julie H]

<p>.<br>

.<br>

<img src="https://unrealnature.files.wordpress.com/2016/04/eye01.jpg" alt="" width="700" height="700" />.</p>

<p>. .</p>

[charleswood]

<p>I don't see from Penrose the category mistake attributed to him by Julie. Starting with Bohm: "Consider, for example, an attempt to assert that all of man’s actions are conditions and mechanical." That is, consider the assertion that all people's actions are 'computational', derive from heredity, environment or both heredity and environment combined. So when Penrose suggests instead that there is something 'non-computational' going on in quantum mechanics, he takes Bohm's point that intelligence is not merely conditioned. Consequently, I read Penrose as agreeing with the notion that intelligence is in a category of its own, Penrose terming that category 'non-computational'. I think that Penrose's conjecture implies that our environment and our heredity aren't entirely conditioned and mechanical, that at a fundamental level, something non-computational is going on there too.</p>

<p>Penrose, in the Q&A, leaves open the artificial intelligence question. Despite his 'non-computational' conjecture, he leaves open the question of whether or not a submarine could swim as opposed to just following an existing algorithm. That's fair of him since, after all, the answer to that question, as Supriyo points out, is not known.</p>

<p>Are all of a tree's actions conditioned and mechanical? <a href="/bboard/German%20Forest%20Ranger%20Finds%20That%20Trees%20Have%20Social%20Networks,%20Too"><em>German Forest Ranger Finds That Trees Have Social Networks, Too</em></a></p>

<blockquote>

<p>PRESENTING scientific research and his own observations in highly anthropomorphic terms, the matter-of-fact Mr. Wohlleben has delighted readers and talk-show audiences alike with the news — long known to biologists — that trees in the forest are social beings. They can count, learn and remember; nurse sick neighbors; warn each other of danger by sending electrical signals across a fungal network known as the “Wood Wide Web”; and, for reasons unknown, keep the ancient stumps of long-felled companions alive for centuries by feeding them a sugar solution through their roots.</p>

</blockquote>

<p>If we knew that a tree had subjectivity, we would divide into two camps: those who regard the offerings of sugar to an old stump as motivated from either self-interest of the offerers or as motivated by love.</p>

[charleswood]

<p>So just to be clearer, as Fred has shown us photographically that to be human is to love, perhaps Mr. Wohllenben has shown us that a tree also loves.</p>

[Supriyo]

<blockquote>

<p>'Truth' isn't the peak of a mountain, it's a continuous process of knowledge as thought. There's no mountain top to reach, neither in science nor in art.</p>

</blockquote>

<p> <br>

In the broader sense, no. I agree. However I was referring more to concrete short term goals, like solving a scientific problem or creating an artwork. [Veering a little off-track, is knowledge (or wisdom) really infinite, or can it have a bound, a destiny?]<br>

<br>

The analogy of mountain top is less important to me. More importantly, what I wanted to say is, in most cases the process of gaining wisdom involves a combination of intelligence and experience. Even if a flash of perception can show one a fresh new direction, still the history of failed prior attempts (what Bohm refers to as conscious logical/mechanical process) is relevant to that perception. So is the knowledge gained from ancestors.</p>

[Supriyo]

<blockquote>

<p>PRESENTING scientific research and his own observations in highly anthropomorphic terms, the matter-of-fact Mr. Wohlleben has delighted readers and talk-show audiences alike with the news — long known to biologists — that trees in the forest are social beings. They can count, learn and remember; nurse sick neighbors; warn each other of danger by sending electrical signals across a fungal network known as the “Wood Wide Web”; and, for reasons unknown, keep the ancient stumps of long-felled companions alive for centuries by feeding them a sugar solution through their roots.</p>

</blockquote>

<p><br /> I am not discounting it, but I am skeptical of the claim that the above description is evidence of non-mechanical consciousness. Non-mechanical consciousness, I would argue is associated with irrational choices that cannot be explained or predicted by logic alone. Social networks and all associated skills like counting and learning can appear due to evolutionary pressure. Feeding sugar solution to a dead companion could be vestigial remnant of an earlier era where it was necessary to keep these stumps alive for a long time to spur new growth at a later era.<br /> <br />Related question: Is love really non-mechanical, or is it being non-mechanical an inspirational feeling?</p>

[Supriyo]

<blockquote>

<p>what it's like to be human</p>

</blockquote>

<p><br /> Fred,<br /> Thank you for your humble and sensible portrayal of humanity. I find it very touching.</p>

[charleswood]

<p>Supriyo - "I am not discounting it, but I am skeptical of the claim that the above description is evidence of non-mechanical consciousness."<br /> <br /> I agree, and Penrose's contribution to the study of consciousness/intelligence is to offer a few interesting observations, raise some questions, and suggest areas where there might be empirical evidence.<br /> <br /> Supriyo - "Related question: Is love really non-mechanical, or is it being non-mechanical an inspirational feeling?" And hence, mechanical after all since inspirational feelings have a purpose in the mechanism?? <br /> <br /> Another way of asking that question, if I understood it correctly, might be "Is love an irreducible?" </p>

[Laura Weishaupt]

<p>I've followed this thread from the beginning. It's been an interesting ride thus far. I'm a firm believer in the notion that all knowledge is integrated, and that while it may take awhile to get from Kepler's Laws to scrambled eggs, eventually that connection might be made. Well, you've gone from philosophy, to scrambled eggs (and even toast!), to the nature of love, and onto fungal ecology. Well, OK, and I mean that in a sincerely good way.</p>

<p>In an off line exchange with Charles W, I mentioned that I photograph the "wood wide web". Fungi are my thing. He'd like to see that. Here it is, mycelium, the web itself. It's not abstract. Relationships between fungi, plants, and animals are old and complex. Many of these life forms have evolved together. Mychorrhizal relationships, of which the German forester speaks, are mutually beneficial. Yes, biologists have known about the basics of these relationships, but just how complex they are is new and amazing. Is any of it "love"? I'll leave that to the philosophers to discuss. I'll go back to the forest and hug a Mother Tree.</p>

<div></div>

[Julie H]

<p>Laura wrote: "I'm a firm believer in the notion that all <strong><em>knowledge</em></strong> is integrated ... " [emphasis added]</p>

<p>I agree completely.</p>

<p>I'm tickled that you've posted. Gorgeous picture (I have a complete weakness for water droplets, never mind spider webs ... ).</p>

[Norma Desmond]

<p><a href="http://www.fflch.usp.br/df/opessoa/Dennett-Quining-Qualia.pdf">QUINING QUALIA, by Daniel Dennett</a></p>

<p>Sorry, the above doesn't reduce well to a few paragraphs of quotes which can serve as the "proof" of a conclusion. </p>

[charleswood]

<p>Self Comes To Mind – Constructing the Conscious Brain by Antonio Damasio. Excerpt: Page 269 paperback, [Damasio is on <a href="https://www.ted.com/talks/antonio_damasio_the_quest_to_understand_consciousness?language=en">Ted Talks </a>and gives an outline of his book there for anyone interested.]</p>

<blockquote>

<p>When We Feel Our Perceptions<br /> Anyone interested in the matters of brain, mind, and consciousness has heard of qualia and has an opinion regarding what neuroscience can do about the issue: take it seriously and try and deal with it, or consider it intractable and table it, or dismiss it outright.<br /> <br />In the text ahead, qualia is treated as a composite of two problems. In one, qualia refers to the feelings that are an obligate part of any subjective experience – some shade of pleasure or its absence, some shade of pain or discomfort, well-being, or lack thereof. I call this the Qualia I problem. The other problem cuts deeper. If subjective experiences are accompanied by feelings, how are feeling states engendered in the first place? This goes beyond the question of how any experience acquires specific sense qualities in our mind, such as the sound of a cello, the taste of wine, or the blueness of the sea. It addresses a blunter question: Why should the construction of perceptual maps, which are physical, neurochemical events, feel like something? Why should they feel like anything at all? That is the Qualia II problem.</p>

</blockquote>

<p>Dennett dismisses the Qualia I problem outright and I didn't see where he addressed the Qualia II problem. Damasio writes on page 272 that "although the qualia issue is traditionally regarded as part of the consciousness problem, I believe it belongs more appropriately under the mind rubric. Qualia I responses concern objects being processed in the mind and add another element to the mind. I do not regard the Qualia I problem as a mystery." As to the Qualia II problem, after exploring some properties of neurons [specifically not those neural quantum effects pursued by Penrose] Damasio uses "evolutionary reasoning":</p>

<blockquote>

<p>If perceptual maps of the body are to be effective in leading an organism toward avoidance of pain and seeking of pleasure, they should not only feel like something, they actually <em>ought</em> to feel like something. The neural construction of pain and pleasure states must have been arrived at early in evolution and must have played a critical role in its course.</p>

</blockquote>

<p>Evolutionary reasoning is strong, yet can we fully explain a sense of self-existence by its functions? And to the layman me it is intriguing to look at Laura's rendition (photo in her post) of what amounts to nature's solution to the <a href="https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Travelling_salesman_problem">traveling salesman problem</a> (TSP) where I can't help but side with those who suspect that quantum effects may be involved in the solution. Again, as a layman I can't help but analogize a 'wood wide web' to our own wiring. All those connections and fibers in Laura's photo: we might as well be looking at a nervous system in an animal.</p>

<p>Laura, in a separate exchange provided a link <a href="http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/artful-amoeba/dying-trees-can-send-food-to-neighbors-of-different-species/">Dying Trees Can Send Food to Neighbors of Different Species - No tree is an island, and no place is this truer than the forest</a> .</p>

<blockquote>

<p>To my surprise, I discovered when researching this post that it has been known for a while that trees of <em>different</em> species can communicate with and support one another via their mycorrhizae. I had already known that plants can communicate with unrelated species through the air; plants getting chomped by herbivores release volatile chemicals that are sensed by neighboring plants, who up their defenses pro-actively. But communicating — and even sharing resources — through mutual root fungi was news to me.<br /> ----<br /> This amazes me. On the face of it, it appears as if the douglas-fir is acting altruistically (without expectation of return) to help neighbors of a completely different species in light of its own probable demise. Even without the altruism, that trees as widely unrelated as douglas-fir and ponderosa pine can transfer resources to each other for any reason through fungi from a completely different kingdom is a shocker to me.</p>

<p>Did the douglas-fir “intentionally” and altruistically send food and defensive signals to the ponderosa pine, or did the fungus act to take them there? It’s possible that it is only a passive effect of a source-sink scenario, where the douglas-fir dumped food into its mycorrhizae for safe-keeping in light of severe stress, and the excess resources simply moved from an area of high concentration to an area of low concentration (the growing, resource-hungry ponderosa pine). It’s also possible the douglas-fir is behaving somewhat altruistically and somewhat pragmatically, since exporting carbon to its root network may benefit nearby trees that are close relatives (offspring, even?), and any spillover to trees of completely different species that keeps them healthy may also benefit these same relatives by keeping the entire forest system healthy.</p>

<p>Finally, it’s also possible the fungus played the more calculated role of a broker with its own interests in mind and “acted to protect its net carbon source,” in the words of the authors, “by allocating carbon and signals to the healthy, more reliable ponderosa pine.”</p>

</blockquote>

<p>Fungus in the calculated role of a self-interested broker versus motivated by love, confirming what I wrote earlier "If we knew that a tree had subjectivity, we would divide into two camps: those who regard the offerings of sugar to an old stump as motivated from either self-interest of the offerers or as motivated by love." Of course, we still don't know if a tree or if a fungus has a sense of itself, has a lived experience of itself. That's a big if, a real big one. IF IF IF IF for emphasis to those who might see nothing but 'woo' in such speculations.</p>

<p>In other words, I can't help but suspect that Damasio's argument as to the origins of consciousness proceeds upon lines I imagine as objectionable to Griffin, who Julie quoted "It involves instead the alleged emergence of an "inside" from things that have only outsides." That's termed a category mistake and I tend to agree with Griffin's view. I do think generally, in asking allowances from a resistant reader, there's a natural tendency to overstate one's case.</p>

<p>Damasio doesn't in that book find, as I do, a problem in regarding consciousness as originating in exclusively evolutionary/mechanical processes. The way I state that problem is in terms of relative motion where my view is that an organism's (which ever Kingdom) adaptive motion can't occur without a fixed point of reference from which to measure motions of bodies relative to it. When a single celled organism with a tail moves it tail, it isn't random motion, it's advantaged motion. William Jame's statement that to an infant human, the world is a blooming buzzing confusion is also a description of the world that a single celled organism inhabits within its 'skin' and Damasio apparently doesn't see a cell membrane as intelligent despite that a cell membrane evolved into the nervous system he respects in animals as housing a protoself, at least beginning with the jellyfish which I take is the first organism with a persistent nervous system, sea sprites eating theirs all up when they set down roots. But if a sense of itself is a sense like a sense of touch, taste, hearing and if a single celled organism has to have a sense of self for adaptive motion to occur, then consciousness starts looking like a fundamental property of nature, provided Penrose's non-computational is ever fleshed out more fully.</p>

<p><a href="

Krause </a>finds a qualia type response in a sea anemone in a Ted Talk. I tend to take a sea anemone's feelings seriously, not dismissively.</p>

<p> </p>

[charleswood]

<p>Speaking to the dogma about plants is <a href="

Mancuso</a>, a founder of the study of plant neurobiology, a Ted Talk.</p>

[Norma Desmond]

<p>I'm not sure about attributing motivations to the tree, or to Julius offering a helping hand to Emily in that photo of mine. Was it love? I don't know. Maybe it was duty. Maybe being in the right place at the right time. Maybe something else. But it helped get her past the puddle and to where she was going! </p>

<p>Now, in my photo work in this farming community I have other photos that show people being more solitary. Just like in my San Francisco work in addition to the photo of me seeming to step out of myself in the studio I have much more corporeal photos. I don't feel as though I'm shooting my beliefs. Often, I feel like I'm shooting questions . . . or dialogues.</p>

[charleswood]

<p>I'm not sure on those points either, if motivation attribute to trees and where motivation does attribute, as in Julius, what the motivations are. As to trees, quoted above: "It’s possible that it is only a passive effect of a source-sink scenario, where the douglas-fir dumped food into its mycorrhizae for safe-keeping in light of severe stress, and the excess resources simply moved from an area of high concentration to an area of low concentration (the growing, resource-hungry ponderosa pine). " Pure mechanism - something like osmosis - or not? Who knows. <br>

<br>

Here's Arthur Zajonc v Michael Mccullough, the latter mechanistic, the former makes his case for another category. <a href="http://www.onbeing.org/program/arthur-zajonc-michael-mccullough-mind-and-morality-a-dialogue/7316">Mind and Morality: A Dialogue</a> , introvert v. extrovert in a familiar sounding dialogue since some of the predispositions toward either point of view surface in this thread where introvert and extrovert are less about behavior (action v. bookish) than an attitude. Mccullough lives well without the category that Zajonc can't live well without. <br>

<br>

</p>

<p> </p>

[Allen Herbert]

<p>The thread has now reached its end...</p>

<p>So.... thank you, to all who have participated; I felt that ALL posts were informative....yes, including you, Supriyo.</p>

<p>I particularly enjoyed Charles postings, which to my mind, went to another place of imagination and understanding.</p>

<p>Cheers.</p>